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Abstract 
 
The cartel is regarded as a desease that inflicts on the open market economy. Whilst its presence is 
detrimental to the public, the most serious issue is its secrecy, which has posed a major problem to 
competition authorities all over the world. To address this, many countries including Malaysia have 
introduced a leniency programme for the detection of cartels by persuading their members to approach 
the authorities to admit involvement in the cartel activities and assist the authorities to expose other 
cartel participants. The objective of this paper is to conduct a study on the legal framework of the cartel 
and Malaysia’s leniency programme. The paper contains a detailed analysis of the Competition Act 2010 
(Act 712) (CA 2010), the Guidelines on Leniency Regime (Leniency Guidelines) by the Malaysian 
Competition Commission (MyCC) and academic research in this area. The findings show that while the 
leniency programme is available under the Leniency Guidelines, data on leniency applications made to 
date are not available on the MyCC’s website. In addition, the MyCC’s decisions published on its 
website revealed that of six cartels that were found to have committed infringement, none had been first 
detected through the leniency programme. Therefore, the effectiveness of the programme has yet to be 
proven. 
 
Keywords: Cartel, Competition Act 2010, leniency programme, Malaysian Competition Commission  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Connor (2008) defined a cartel as “an association of two or more legally independent firms that 
explicitly agree to coordinate their prices or output for the purpose of increasing their collective 
profits.” Based on this definition, the purpose of a cartel is to control the market with the aim of 
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restricting competition. The reason for restricting competition is to maximise their profits collectively 
(Jasper, 2017). A cartel weakens an economic system that is based on an open market (Whelan, 
2007). Among the adverse effects of the cartel is that other businesses that are not in favour of anti-
competitive agreements have to cease operations because they cannot compete on prices or they 
are kept out of the market. Therefore, consumers will lose because they have fewer choices, face 
higher prices, and get products or services of lower quality. In addition, the economy will not grow 
as new businesses are unable to penetrate the market and existing businesses have no incentive 
to become more innovative and efficient (MyCC, 2012). Hence, cartels are likened to cancer in an 
open economic system, and it only works to rob consumers’ money (Monti, 2000). Cartels were 
also described as the “supreme evil of antitrust” by the US Supreme Court in Verizons 
Communications v Law Offices of Curtis v Trinko, 540 US 398, 408 (2004). They are seen as the 
most heinous competition violator and one of the most damaging to the economy (Rodger & 
Macculloch, 2015). Hence, cartel detection and deterrence are among the highest priorities of 
competition authorities (Chen & Rey, 2013). However, fighting the cartel is not an easy task (Monti, 
2000). Among the critical challenges faced by competing authorities around the world is in exposing 
the existence of cartels. This is because the cartel exists in secrecy (Chen & Harrington, 2007). In 
general, cartel participants are aware that their cartel activities are in violation of competition law. 
As such, they will work hard to ensure that their activities are not sniffed and detected by the 
competition authorities. This has resulted in the authorities encountering difficulties in detecting and 
gathering sufficient evidence to prove the violation committed by the cartel (Jones & Sufrin, 2016). 
Research by Pavlov and Shastitko (2016) showed that in order to make detecting cartels easier, 
leniency programmes have been introduced in many countries around the world. The programme is 
designed to encourage cartel participants to come forward not only to confess their involvement in 
cartel activities but also to collaborate with the competition authorities in leading for discovery of the 
cartel. In return, the participants of the cartel will be immunised or offered reduced penalties 
(Middleton, Rodger & MacCulloch, 2009). Likewise, in Malaysia, the leniency programme has been 
employed by the MyCC to detect cartels. The programme can be found in section 41 of the CA 
2010.1  
 
2. Methodology 
 
A qualitative approach was employed for this paper which consisting of a detailed analysis of the 
CA 2010, Leniency Guidelines, other related guidelines issued by the MyCC and academic 
research in this area. 
 
3. The legal framework on the prohibition of cartels in Malaysia 
 
The CA 2010 governs the laws on competition in Malaysia. In general, the CA 2010 aims to 
promote economic development by promoting and protecting the process of competition, thereby 
protecting the interests of consumers and to provide for matters connected therewith. To achieve 
this aim, several practices are prohibited due to their anti-competition nature. Among these 
prohibitions are enterprises are not allowed to enter into any horizontal or vertical agreement with 
the objective of or giving effect to preventing and restricting the competitive processes as stated in 
section 4(1) of the CA 2010. The term ‘enterprises’ is used to denote “any entity carrying on 
commercial activities relating to goods or services.” The full text of the section reads as follows: 
1. A horizontal or vertical agreement between enterprises is prohibited insofar as the 
agreement has the object or effect of significantly preventing, restricting or distorting 
competition in any market for goods or services.  
2. Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), a horizontal agreement between 
enterprises which has the object to: 
                                                            
1 The CA 2010 was passed by the Parliament and came into force on 1st January 2012. 
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a. fix, directly, or indirectly, a purchase or selling price or any other trading conditions; 
b. share market or sources of supply; 
c. limit or control: 
i. production; 
ii. market outlets or market access; 
iii. technical or technological development; or 
iv. investment; or 
v. perform an act of bid rigging,  
is deemed to have the object of significantly preventing, restricting, or distorting 
competition in any market for goods or services. 
 
3. Any enterprise which is a party to an agreement which is prohibited under this section 
shall be liable for infringement of the prohibition. 
With reference to the above section, there are two types of agreements, namely the horizontal 
agreement and the vertical agreement. A horizontal agreement refers to an agreement between 
enterprises operating at the same level (business competitors) in the production or distribution 
chain (Section 2 of the CA 2010). Meanwhile, a vertical agreement refers to the agreement 
between enterprises operating at different levels in the production or distribution chain (Section 2 of 
the CA 2010). In the context of the CA 2010, the agreement is not restricted to a written agreement 
only but also includes oral agreements whether through telephone or in meetings either in private or 
in social settings (Paragraph 2.1 of the MyCC Guidelines on Chapter 1 Prohibition, Anti-Competitive 
Agreements (Guidelines of Chapter 1). Based on the reading of section 4 of the CA 2010, the word 
‘cartel’ is not found or defined in the CA 2010. However, it has been defined by the MyCC in 
Paragraph 1.1 of the Leniency Guidelines as “a horizontal agreement between enterprises with the 
object of significantly preventing, restricting or distorting competition in any market for goods or 
services”. With reference to the definition provided, it can be inferred that the cartel is prohibited 
under section 4(1) and is read together with section 4(2) of the CA 2010. Section 4(2) of the CA 
2010 is a deeming provision where a horizontal agreement between enterprises that has the object 
to fix prices, divide the market, agree to restrict production, investment and technological 
advancement, as well as bid rigging is deemed to have the object of significantly preventing, 
restricting, or distorting competition in any market for goods or services. The word ‘deeming’ means 
that the MyCC will not have to conduct a detailed analysis, including taking into consideration the 
marketing aspect of an enterprise because it is considered as restricting competition. In other 
words, the MyCC only needs to prove the existence of the cartel. The reason is that the existence 
of the cartel itself is sufficient to prove the existence of the object of significantly preventing, 
restricting, or distorting competition in any market for goods or services. The position on this matter 
is further elaborated in paragraph 3.25 of the Guidelines on Chapter 1 relating to the prohibition 
under section 4 of the CA 2010 which states that: 
It is important to note that section 4(2) of the Act treats certain kinds of horizontal agreements 
between enterprises as anti-competitive. In these situations, the agreements are deemed to “have 
the object of significantly preventing, restricting, or distorting competition in any market for goods or 
services.” 
Therefore, section 4(2) of the CA 2010 and paragraph 3.25 of the Guidelines on Chapter 1 
indicate that the MyCC has a strong stance and disapproval against the cartel and therefore, the 
cartel should be prohibited on the grounds that the agreement has a clear object to prevent and 
restrict the process of competition. Among the examples of cartel agreements are price fixing, 
market sharing and bid rigging.  
 
3.1 Price fixing 
 
Price fixing means an agreement among competitors to increase, fix, or maintain the price at which 
they sell their goods or services (The United States Department of Justice, n.d).  
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3.2 Market sharing 
 
Market sharing refers to an agreement between competitors to split the market by location and 
allocate each area to a specific participant, effectively creating a monopoly in each area. This 
practice has the effect of limiting the options available to consumers, resulting in increased prices or 
lower outputs (Dabbah, 2004). 
 
3.3 Bid rigging 
 
An agreement is made between two bidders in a tender exercise, effectively distorting the normal 
conditions of competition. The agreement includes who should win the tender at the agreed price 
(MyCC, 2014).2 
Above are examples of restriction of competition by object. If one of them is present in the 
agreement, then the agreement is deemed to have violated the CA 2010. 
 
4. Enforcement against cartels in Malaysia 
 
The MyCC is an independent body incorporated under the Competition Commission Act 2010 to 
enforce the CA 2010 (MyCC, n.d). The MyCC was established with the aim of protecting and 
maintaining the competition process for the benefit of businesses, customers, and the economy 
(Safinaz, Ahmad Azam, Nazura, Ramalinggam, & Mazliza, 2014). Among the duties of the MyCC is 
to enforce the provisions of the CA 2010 to ensure compliance with its provisions. The enforcement 
duty is crucial for protecting the competition process for the benefit of businesses, customers, and 
the economy (MyCC, n.d.). The MyCC’s power to carry out the enforcement action is apparent 
under section 14 of the CA 2010 which provides for the MyCC to carry out any investigation if it has 
any reason to suspect that any business has infringed or is infringing any prohibition under the CA 
2010. The CA 2010 grants the power to the MyCC to investigate and take action against any 
company involved in anti-competition practices including the cartel. Generally, the MyCC may 
conduct the investigation when it is suspected that there is an infringement by any enterprise or 
arising from complaints made by the public as well as upon instruction by the Minister charged with 
the responsibility for domestic trade and consumer affairs (Section 14 of the CA 2010). To ensure 
that the investigation can be carried out efficiently and effectively, the MyCC is armed with wide 
investigative powers, namely the power to inquire information (Section 18 of the CA 2010), the 
power to retain documents (Section 19 of the CA 2010), the power to access records (Section 20 of 
the CA 2010), as well as the power to search and seize with or without a warrant (Sections 25 and 
26 of the CA 2010). Of the many anti-competition agreements, the MyCC stresses upon the 
enforcement towards the cartel because it is deemed as the most serious infringement of the CA 
2010 and gives an adverse impact on the country’s economy (MyCC, n.d). Section 4(2) of the CA 
2010 lists down examples of agreements that are deemed as a cartel and considered as having the 
object to limit or restrict competition that is against section 4(1) of the CA 2010. In terms of the 
enforcement method, there are various methods which have been made available for the MyCC in 
enforcing the cartel. Among these methods is the leniency programme as embodied in section 41 of 
the CA 2010, which will be explained in the next paragraph. 
The first case investigated and taken action by the MyCC since the enforcement of the CA 
2010 on January 1, 2012 was the case of the Cameron Highlands Floriculturist Association (CHFA) 
(Shila & Burgess, 2016). In this case, the CHFA was investigated under section 4(2)(a) CA 2010 for 
agreeing to increase the price of flowers sold to distributors and wholesalers by 10% in Malaysia. 
The MyCC found the existence of infringement under the said section whereby members of the 
CHFA through the CHFA had entered into a horizontal agreement between enterprises to fix, 
directly or indirectly, the purchase or selling price. The MyCC ordered the CHFA to carry out the 
                                                            
2 MyCC’s Handbook in Help Us Detect Bid Rigging which was published in June 2014. 
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followings: to cease and desist from the act of price fixing of flowers; to provide an undertaking that 
the members will refrain from anti-competitive practices in the market; and to issue the remedial 
actions that they have undertaken in the mainstream newspapers. Since then, the MyCC has 
increased its efforts in eradicating anti-competition agreements particularly cartels in Malaysia. 
Based on the statement by a Member of the MyCC, Datin Seri Ruzaina Wan Hanif, the MyCC has 
investigated 80 cases involving cartel activities for the past seven years (Zanariah Abd Mutalib, 
2018). However, there is a big difference between the number of cartel cases investigated and the 
number of infringements found by the MyCC under section 40 of the CA 2010. Based on the 
decisions published by the MyCC on its website, from 2012 until 2018, six cases involved cartels 
whereby the MyCC had found infringement of section 40 of the CA 2010 (MyCC, n.d). A list of the 
cases is provided below:  
 
No. Facts Decision Order 
1. CHFA was investigated under section 4(2)(a) of CA 2010 for 
agreeing to increase the price of flowers sold to distributors 
and wholesalers by 10% in Malaysia effective from 16 
March 2012. 
[Case Number: MyCC/0003/2012(ACA)]. 
On 6th December 2012, the 
MyCC issued a decision 
finding that there is an 
infringement under section 
40 of the CA 2010 for 
violating section 4(2)(a) of 
the CA 2010. 
The MyCC instructed the CHFA 
to: 
(i) cease and desist the 
infringing act of fixing prices of 
flowers;  
(ii) provide an undertaking that 
its members shall refrain from 
any anti-competitive practices 
in the relevant market; and  
(iii) issue a statement on the 
above mentioned remedial 
actions in the mainstream 
newspapers. 
2. Malaysian Airline System Berhad (MAS), AirAsia Berhad 
(Air Asia), and AirAsia X Sdn. Bhd. were investigated under 
section 4(2)(b) of the CA 2010 for agreeing to share the 
Malaysian air transport services market. In this case, the 
three said companies had entered into a Comprehensive 
Collaboration Framework on 9th August 2011 to refine their 
emphasis on core competencies as well as provide 
enhanced offerings and options to their clients, thereby 
increasing stakeholders’ value. 
[Case Number: No. MyCC.0001.2012].  
On 31st March 2014, the 
MyCC issued a decision 
finding that there is an 
infringement under section 
40 of the CA 2010 for 
violating section 4(2)(b) of 
the CA 2010.  
 
 
 
The MyCC imposed a financial 
penalty of RM10 million on 
MAS and AirAsia respectively. 
AirAsia and MAS had appealed 
against the decision. On 4th 
February 2016, the Competition 
Appeal Tribunal set aside the 
penalty of RM10 million 
imposed on MAS and AirAsia, 
which were found to have 
infringed the prohibition against 
market sharing. 
On 25th July 2016, the High 
Court granted leave to the 
MyCC to challenge the decision 
by the Competition Appeal 
Tribunal.  
On 20th December 2018, the 
High Court set aside the 
Competition Appeal Tribunal’s 
decision and upheld the 
MyCC’s decision imposing a 
fine of RM10 million on MAS 
and AirAsia. 
3. The MyCC investigated twenty-six ice manufacturers with 
business operations primarily in Kuala Lumpur, Selangor, 
and Putrajaya under section 4(2)(a) of the CA 2010 for 
collectively increasing the price of edible tube ice and block 
ice by RM0.50 per bag and RM2.50 per big block, 
respectively from 1st January 2014.  
[Case Number: No. MyCC.700.2.0001.2014]. 
On 30th January 2015, 
the MyCC issued a 
decision finding that there 
is an infringement under 
section 40 of the CA 2010 
for violating section 4(2)(a) 
of the CA 2010. 
The MyCC imposed a financial 
penalty of RM283,600. 
4. The MyCC investigated fifteen enterprises under section 
4(2)(a) of the CA 2010 for entering into a horizontal 
agreement with the aim of fixing the selling price of 
confectionery and bakery products in Sibu, Sarawak, either 
directly or indirectly. 
[Case Number: No. MyCC.0045.2013]. 
On 12th February 2015, 
the MyCC issued a 
decision finding that there 
is an infringement under 
section 40 of the CA 2010 
for violating section 4(2)(a) 
of the CA 2010. 
 
The MyCC imposed a financial 
penalty of RM247,730. 
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5. The MyCC investigated two cases, namely: 
i. Containerchain (M) Sdn. Bhd. and four companies, which 
are Ayza Industries Sdn. Bhd./Ayza Logistics Sdn. Bhd, ICS 
Depot Services Sdn. Bhd., E.A.E. Depot & Freight 
Forwarding Sdn. Bhd., and Prompt Dynamics Sdn. Bhd. 
(“Container Depot Operators”) under section 4(1) of the CA 
2010 for acting in concert by entering into vertical 
agreements to enable the Container Depot Operators to 
raise the Depot Gate Charges to RM25 from RM5 
previously to the customers and to offer a fixed rebate of 
RM5 to hauliers in respect of the Depot Gate Charges. 
ii. The Container Depot Operators under section 4(2)(a) of 
the CA 2010 for entering into a horizontal agreement to fix 
the RM25 Depot Gate Charges and the RM5 rebate as 
stated above, deemed as purposely preventing, restricting 
or distorting market competition in a significant manner for 
the provision of empty container storage together with 
services for maintenance and handling within a radius of 
five to fifteen kilometres from the Penang Port.  
[Case Number: No. 700.2.005.2013]  
On 1st June 2016, the 
MyCC issued a decision 
finding that there is an 
infringement under section 
40 of the CA 2010 for 
violating section 4(1) and 
4(2)(a) of the CA 2010. 
The MyCC imposed a total 
financial penalty of RM645,774 
and an additional penalty of 
RM7,000 for each day should 
they fail to comply with the 
remedial actions within thirty 
(30) days from the date of the 
MyCC’s decision. 
6. The MyCC investigated seven tuition and day-care centres 
for agreeing to fix and standardise the tuition and day-care 
services’ fees in the SS19 area of Subang Jaya, Selangor.  
[Case Number: No. 700.1.1.43.2017]. 
 
On 26th October 2018, the 
MyCC issued a decision 
finding that there is an 
infringement under section 
40 of the CA 2010 for 
violating section 4(2) read 
with section 4(3) of the CA 
2010. 
The MyCC imposed a financial 
penalty of RM33,068.85 
 
 
 
Based on the statistics shown above, from 2012 until 2018, the number of cartel infringements 
found by the MyCC is about six cases which means, on average, not even one case per year.  
The cases involve floriculture, aviation, ice production, confectionary and bakery, depot 
industries and tuition and day-care services. A thorough examination of the cases indicate that five 
cartel activities as listed from 1 to 5 in the table above were sniffed by the MyCC when those 
activities were exposed by the cartel participants themselves through various media including the 
newspapers, notices, and flyers. This can be seen from the following explanation: 
1. The President of the CHFA issued a statement published in the online portal of The Star 
that the CHFA will increase the prices of flowers by 10%. 
2. The collaborative agreement between MAS and Air Asia was reported in the mass media 
including The Star newspaper and Utusan Malaysia. 
3. Local newspapers including The Sun, Harian Metro, Malaysia Nanban and Sin Chew Daily 
reported on the increase in the price of ice. 
4. The Borneo Post published an article on 20th November 2013 carrying the title of 
“Announcement of price hike draws the attention of MyCC.” 
5. The Container Depot Operators in Penang had issued notices and distributed flyers to 
their customers at roughly the same time to notify them about the hike in Depot Gate 
Charges to RM25 from RM5 previously. 
On the other hand, for the last cartel listed in table, the first information received by the MyCC 
about the alleged cartel was through complaint made by a complainant alleging adjustment and 
standardisation of fees.  
Therefore, it can be concluded that of six cartel cases whereby the MyCC found the 
infringements, five of them were initially detected through exposure by the cartel participants 
themselves which are subsequently followed by enforcement actions by the MyCC and one through 
complaint lodged by a complainant. The concern is what will happen when enterprises no longer 
expose their activities openly, and they carry out their cartel activities in secrecy. In other words, 
there will no longer be any exposure through the mass media, notices, or any other medium. If this 
were to happen, the MyCC might have difficulty in detecting and obtaining strong evidence to prove 
the existence of cartel activities unless public come forward and lodge complain about the 
existence of cartel. Thus, to overcome this difficulty, MyCC must make leniency programme more 
attractive to persuade more cartel participants to come forward with information leading to the 
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breakdown of the cartels. Notably, the MyCC needs to play its role in spreading information about 
the leniency programme, the conditions that must be complied with, and the benefits that will be 
gained upon successful application to the enterprises that are running their business in Malaysia. 
Sufficient and accurate information can bring a positive impact on the number of whistleblowers as 
intended when section 41 was included in the CA 2010. 
 
5. Leniency programme in Malaysia 
 
Broadly stated, the aim of the leniency programme is to encourage cartel participants to take 
advantage of the leniency given by coming forward to the competition authority to admit their 
involvement in a cartel and collaborate with the authority to identify other cartel participants in 
exchange for partial or total immunity from the penalties (Frese, 2014). The leniency programme in 
Malaysia is explained under section 41 of the CA 2010 and further elaborated in the Leniency 
Guidelines issued by the MyCC. Section 41 of the CA 2010 is a specific provision to assist the 
MyCC in fighting cartel activities. The section expressly states that leniency is only available for a 
breach of section 4(2) of the CA 2010. Any enterprise wishing to apply for leniency should make a 
telephone call to the leniency hotline number posted on the MyCC’s website (Paragraph 5.3 of the 
Leniency Guidelines). Through the leniency hotline, a potential cartel applicant may ask about the 
availability of leniency with regard to a certain situation; apply a ‘marker’ to mark priority over other 
applicants; and ask questions about conditions for making a leniency application (Paragraph 5.5 of 
the Leniency Guidelines). The completed leniency application should be made in writing unless 
dictated otherwise by the MyCC, and signed by an authorised senior officer of the applicant 
(Paragraph 6.3 of the Leniency Guidelines). 
Generally, section 41 of the CA 2010 allows the MyCC to grant a reduction on the amount of 
financial penalty that could otherwise be imposed on the infringing enterprise up to 100% subject to 
the conditions specified. With reference to section 41(1) of the CA 2010, the conditions that must be 
fulfilled to obtain a reduction of up to 100% on the financial penalty requires the enterprise to 
confess about its involvement in an infringement of any prohibition under section 4(2) of the CA 
2010, namely in a cartel, and to give information or cooperation that can significantly assist the 
MyCC in the identification or investigation of any finding of an infringement of any prohibition by any 
other enterprises. The issue arising is that what is meant by significant assistance? To answer this 
question, the MyCC has provided guidance as stated in paragraph 6.4 of the Leniency Guidelines 
which is the applicant has to provide a detailed description of the suspected infringement of a 
prohibition under subsection 4(2) of the CA 2010 about the cartel including: 
i. objectives, activities, and function of the cartel; 
ii. the products or services involved and their geographical scope; and 
iii. activities of the cartel with dates, times, places, purpose and content of any meetings, 
conversations, or another contact. 
Paragraph 3.4 of the Leniency Guidelines clarifies that the 100% financial reduction will only 
be granted if the cartel participant is the first person to report to the MyCC and the information 
provided is not yet known to the MyCC. However, the 100% financial reduction will not be granted if 
the enterprise was the first to initiate the cartel activity (the ringleader) or the cartel participant was 
the one who forced other enterprises to join in the cartel activities (Paragraph 2.7 of the Leniency 
Guidelines).  
Nevertheless, the first applicant who does not fulfil the conditions stated above, the second 
and subsequent applicants are still eligible for the reduction of less than 100% subject to the 
following (section 41 (2) of the CA 2010):  
a. whether the enterprise was the first person to inform the MyCC about the suspected 
infringement;  
b. at the juncture of the investigation when:  
i. participation in the infringement was admitted; or  
ii. any information or other assistance was given; or 
c. any other situations regarded as appropriate by the MyCC. 
One of the elements in the application process of the leniency programme is the timing when 
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the decision on the application is made known to the applicant. To answer this question, reference 
can be made to paragraph 3.10 of the Leniency Guidelines which states that if the applicant 
satisfies all conditions of the conditional grant of leniency, section 36 of the CA 2010 provides that 
the applicant will be informed of the amount of the reduction through a written notice on the 
proposed decision. With reference to section 36 of the CA 2010, the status of the application will 
only be informed after the investigation has been completed. As a condition for granting the 
conditional leniency, the applicant will have to enter into an agreement to fulfil all the conditions 
imposed by the MyCC, which include: 
i. the applicant shall stop and discontinue the infringement activities that the applicant has 
confessed to being involved in, except in cases where the applicant has been granted 
expressed approval from the MyCC to carry on the activities in the cartel with the aim of 
assisting the MyCC in its investigation (Paragraph 8.4.b of the Leniency Guidelines); 
ii. the applicant shall give complete and truthful disclosure about its involvement in the cartel 
in which it has confessed to participate and furnish all the documentations and if the 
participation is pertaining to another infringement, the applicants’ knowledge of that other 
infringement (Paragraph 8.4.c of the Leniency Guidelines); 
iii. the applicant shall give information or any other assistance required by the MyCC on a 
timely basis, including the assistance of any employee, officer or director regarding the 
cartel in which the participant has confessed to be involved in  (Paragraph 8.4.d. of the 
Leniency Guidelines); and 
iv. the applicant shall not destroy any documentations related to the cartel and shall confirm 
that such documentations have not been destroyed prior to or during the period that leads 
to the conditional grant of leniency (Paragraph 8.4.e. of the Leniency Guidelines).  
Nevertheless, the MyCC reserves its right to change the standard conditions or add other 
suitable conditions according to the specific situations of the application (Paragraph 8.5 of the 
Leniency Guidelines). The conditional grant of leniency shall become unconditional only upon 
fulfilment of all conditions by the applicant and after the MyCC has taken the infringement decision 
(Paragraph 9.1 of the Leniency Guidelines). Apart from that, among the appealing aspects of the 
offer in the leniency programme is that the potential applicant may ask for a ‘marker’ in order to 
preserve its priority in receiving leniency while an application is being prepared (Paragraph 5.6 of 
the Leniency Guidelines). The marker serves as a record of the priority, date and times, and the 
subject for which the enterprise plans to submit an application for leniency, and it shall stipulate the 
deadline for the enterprise to complete its application (Paragraph 5.8 of the Leniency 
Guidelines). The validity period of the marker is 30 days, effective from the date it is granted. 
Failure to complete the application by the deadline will cause the enterprise to lose the reserved 
priority (Paragraph 5.9 of the Leniency Guidelines). Nevertheless, the enterprise may ask for a new 
marker if it still plans to submit the application for leniency. Upon request, a marker will be issued 
for all subsequent applications for leniency. The MyCC reserves the right to extend the deadline 
provided that it is supported by a valid reason and such extension is up to the MyCC’s discretion 
(Paragraph 5.10 of the Leniency Guidelines. 
In summary, the leniency programme provides for a reduction of up to 100% of the fines and a 
marker for the purpose of reserving the priority for receiving leniency subject to certain conditions. 
The offers seem appealing and have the potential to reassure participants in the cartel to approach 
the competition authorities to admit and cooperate with the authorities in their effort to detect the 
existence of the cartel. However, there is no record of leniency applications made to date based on 
the MyCC’s website. In addition, the data on the MyCC’s website reveals that none of the six cartel 
cases which involved infringements was discovered through the leniency programme.  
Referring the case number: No. 700.1.1.43.2017., leniency programme had been applied in 
the case by one of the cartel participants through section 41 of the CA 2010. The application was 
made on 19.12.2017. The application was presented before the MyCC but was dismissed because 
of the followings: 
a. the application was made at an advance stage of investigation and, by that time, the 
MyCC had already obtained most of the evidence required for investigation purposes; and 
b. the evidence shows that the applicant acts as an instigator thereby disqualifying from 
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immunity pursuant to paragraph 27 of the Leniency Guidelines.  
This shows that the application for immunity from fines is subject to conditions as explained 
above. Nevertheless, it should be noted that in light of section 41(2) of the CA 2010, failure to get 
immunity does not deprive the applicant to apply for the reduction of less than 100% subject to the 
fulfilment of conditions as aforementioned.  
 
6. Leniency Programme in the European Union 
 
In the European Union (EU), matters concerning competition are dealt with by the EU Commission. 
The EU Commission is responsible for enforcing EU competition law which aims to make better EU 
markets, by ensuring that all business players compete fairly on their merits (EU Commission, 
2017). Cartels are regarded as the barrier to competition and are therefore prohibited. This has 
been reflected in Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) in 
which it prohibits all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings 
and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their 
object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market. In 
this paper, reference will be made to the practice of leniency programme in the EU. This is because 
the EU Commission has extensive experience in implementing the leniency programme. Notably, it 
has been described as a successful tool to discover and punish cartels (Jones & Sufrin, 2016). The 
EU Commission has firstly introduced the notice on the non-imposition or reduction of fines in cartel 
cases.3 Arbault & Pieró (2002) had described that 1996 Notice as an “indisputable success” and 
stated that the existence of a leniency policy has doubtless been a major contributor to increase of 
the Commission’s anti-cartel activity. It was reported that under the 1996 Notice, the EU 
Commission received 188 applications for non-imposition or reduction of fines and decided either 
not to impose fines or to grant a very substantial reduction (from 75% to 100%) or a significant 
reduction (50% to 75%) in 17 cases (Klimašauskienė & Giedraitis 2011). Despite its success, the 
1996 Notice however, contained certain shortcomings that limited its effectiveness (Stephan, 2006). 
Having said that, it introduced some of the basic guidelines that would guide subsequent versions 
of the programme, such as the requirement for the cooperating company to cease its participation 
in the cartel, to maintain continuous and complete cooperation with the Commission (Borrell, 
Jiménez, & Ordóñez-de-Haro, 2015). 
The following were the examples of shortcomings of the 1996 Notice. Firstly, the 1996 Notice 
did not guarantee complete immunity for the first undertaking to come forward with information 
about the cartel before the EU Commission has undertaken an investigation, ordered by decision 
(Jones & Sufrin, 2016). The 1996 Notice gave a discretion to the EU Commission either not to 
impose fines or to grant a very substantial reduction (from 75 % to 100 %) that would have been 
imposed if the cartel participants had not cooperated. Such wide discretion has made it difficult for 
cartel applicants to predict with certainty whether or not they qualify for full immunity. Secondly, the 
1996 Notice deprived undertaking that had acted as an ‘instigator’ or played a ‘determining role’ in 
the cartel activity of the opportunity to benefit from that notice (Hoang, Hüschelrath, Laitenberger, & 
Smuda, 2014). The exclusion had discouraged spontaneous and early applications by cartel 
members which had a significant role in the cartel and feared that they would ultimately be 
excluded from the benefit of the 1996 Notice (Arbault & Pieró, 2002). Thirdly, the leniency would 
only be granted if the applicant was the “first to adduce decisive evidence of the cartel’s existence” 
(Section B of the 1996 Notice). The definition of ‘decisive standard’ was however lack of 
clarifications on what type of information that could fall under its meaning (Jones & Sufrin, 2016). 
As a result, failure to meet the standard will deny the possibility of obtaining immunity from fines 
that otherwise would have been imposed. 
The Commission then reviewed the 1996 Notice and replaced the 1996 Notice with the 
improved Leniency Notice [ 2002] OJ C45/3 (2002 Notice) on 19th February 2002 with the aim of 
                                                            
3 [1996] OJ C207/4 (1996 Notice). 
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providing greater transparency and certainty (Van Bael, 2011).  
The following were the examples of improvements that had been incorporated in the 2002 
Notice. Unlike the 1996 Notice, the EU Commission will grant full immunity from fines to a first 
company to submit evidence under the 2002 Notice, in two circumstances (Section A of the 2002 
Notice): 
a. to the first member of the cartel to inform the Commission of an undetected cartel by 
providing sufficient information to allow the Commission to launch an inspection on the 
premises of the suspected companies; or 
b. to the first member of the cartel to provide evidence that enables the Commission to 
establish an infringement, when the Commission is already in possession of enough 
information to launch an inspection, but not to establish an infringement. This type of 
immunity is available only in cases where no other cartel member has qualified for 
immunity under the first scenario. 
In addition, under the 2002 Notice, the uncertain wording of decisive evidence was removed 
as many applicants were not entitled to immunity for insufficient evidence and was replaced by 
another evidence test which, in the opinion of the Commission, will enable it to conduct a targeted 
investigation (Stephan, 2008). Furthermore, immunity would also be granted after the investigation 
has been initiated, provided that the information held by the EU Commission was insufficient to 
establish an infringement, and only in cases where no other cartel member had qualified for 
immunity in the first scenario (Section A of the 2002 Notice). Furthermore, under the 2002 Notice, it 
replaced ‘instigator’ and ‘determining role’ with ‘coercer’ (Van Uytsel, & Bi, 2016). This was to 
encourage more cartel participants to come forward even if they would have been considered as 
the previous two to apply for full immunity so long as they do not coerce other undertakings to 
participate in an infringement (Van Barlingen, 2003). Reduction in fine for leniency applicant that 
came later with evidence of significant added value with respect to the evidence already in the 
Commission’s possession was made predictable. The first company which provided evidence of 
significant added value with respect to the evidence already in the Commission’s possession 
received a 30-50 % reduction in the fine which would otherwise have been imposed, the second 
successful applicant 20-30% and subsequent successful applicants will receive a reduction of up to 
20%. Besides, the new feature of the 2002 Notice was the EU Commission will grant a written 
conditional immunity from fines in writing if the undertaking meets the conditions as required by the 
Notice (Stephan, 2008). 
Although several rules appear to be relaxed but not in any way to show that the EU 
Commission has adopted a lenient approach to cartels but instead offers greater clarity and 
predictability which can lead to further cartel detection. This was confirmed by the EU 
Commissioner, Monti as follows:  
This new Notice should not, in any way, be understood as reflecting a more lenient approach 
in the fight against price-fixing and other anti-competitive practices. On the contrary, the new policy 
will increase the likelihood that cartels will be detected which, together with the Commission’s 
determination to impose fines at dissuasive levels, should deter companies from entering into 
collusive behaviour in the first place.4 
Then the EU Commission again replaced the 2002 Notice with 2006 Commission notice on 
immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases (2006 Notice) aiming to improve 
transparency and to provide more guidance to leniency applicants (Centella & Suurnakki, 2007). 
The EU Commission had noted that it was not clear under the 2002 Notice as to what evidence 
should be provided in order to meet the immunity and this resulted in legal uncertainty (Van Bael, 
2011). As such, the current leniency notice sets out a detailed list of information and evidence that 
the applicant should provide in order to qualify for immunity. Having said that, the list is not 
exhaustive. The list was added to increase the clarity and transparency of the procedure. Besides, 
the EU Commission had introduced a marker system to enable a leniency applicant to preserve its 
                                                            
4 Press Release, European Commission, Commission Adopts New Leniency Policy for Companies Which Give 
Information on Cartels (2012, February 13) (Press Release-IP/02/247). 
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position in the queue to apply for leniency by initially providing only limited information (Jones & 
Sufrin, 2016). Moreover, in contrast to the earlier Notices, leniency applicants are no longer 
required to immediately terminate its involvement in the infringement that might jeopardize the 
investigations (Stephan, 2008). 
The revision of the Leniency Program in 2002 and 2006 showed an increase in the trend of 
applications for leniency. The EU Commission received 157 applications for immunity and 146 
applications for reduction of fines from entry into force of the Notice on 14th  February 2002 until the 
end of 2008. The policy to combat cartel through leniency programme in the European Union has, 
without doubt, been a great success. Evidently, the above statistics show that the leniency 
programme has been effective in making cartels more likely to be detected. 
 
7. Recommendations 
 
This paper recommends the following to ensure the attainment of the objective of the Leniency 
Programme. The recommendations will be discussed below. 
 
7.1 More certainty 
 
The MyCC may stipulate the fine reduction in percentages in exchange for the assistance provided 
by cartel applicants that do not qualify for 100% waiver. For instance, when the first, second and 
subsequent cartel applicants do not meet the criteria for immunity (EU Commission, 2016). This will 
provide more legal certainty and predictability. Therefore, the applicant can foresee the amount of 
fines that will be imposed by the MyCC after applying for the reduction.  
 
7.2 More flexibility 
 
Under the current scenario, the cartel member that introduces the cartel (the ring leader) is not 
eligible to apply for immunity from the fines. Similarly, the immunity from fines is not offered when 
the MyCC already has evidence in relation to the cartel. The paper recommends that the MyCC 
provides a wider scope for immunity eligibility so that the ringleader will also be eligible for the 
100% fines waiver provided that it did not force others to participate in the cartel or even after the 
MyCC has commenced its investigation but has not found enough evidence of infringement (Uytsel 
& Ying, 2016; Oded, 2013). The justification is that the leniency programme was introduced to 
destabilise the cartel from within, and hence, application eligibility should be as wide as possible to 
encourage the cartel participants to approach the MyCC to inform about their activities, which will 
create strain and suspicion among the cartel participants. 
 
7.3 More incentive 
 
In order to ensure that the programme manages to entice the cartel participants, the MyCC may 
consider establishing a Cartel Informant Reward Programme to offer attractive cash rewards to any 
person who possesses information about cartels to pass the information to the authorities (Aubert, 
Rey, & Kovacic, 2006). The incentive will serve to increase the fear of discovery by the competition 
authorities and hence, there will be a race among the participants to apply for immunity offered 
under the leniency programme (Aubert, Rey, & Kovacic, 2006). This will increase the probability of 
cartel detection and help destabilising cartels (Miller, 2009). 
 
7.4 Zero Tolerance of accepting undertaking involving cartel cases 
 
The key success factor of the leniency programme is the fear of sanction (Stephan, 2008). The 
punishment against infringement must be severe enough to serve as an effective deterrence. The 
term ‘deterrence’, which means prevention, has both specific and general goals. The purpose of 
specific deterrence is to deter repeat offences by the participants in the future. Meanwhile, the 
general deterrence delivers the message to the public that the authorities will not tolerate 
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infringements and the participants will get harsh punishment. Therefore, it is recommended that the 
provision of section 43 of the CA 2010 in relation to the power to accept undertaking is not applied 
in cartel cases. This is because section 43 (2) of the CA 2010 allows the MyCC to close its 
investigation without making any finding of infringement and hence, the enterprise will not be 
subject to any fines (Haliza & Nazura, 2016). 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
Cartels are regarded as the most dangerous violators of competition and bring an adverse impact 
on the economy. Therefore, the authorities place high priorities on cartel detection and prevention. 
Nevertheless, it takes a lot of efforts to fight the cartels. One way to penetrate through the cartel is 
through the leniency programme, which extends benefits to both the cartel participants that obtain 
immunity against the fine and to the MyCC, which is able to penetrate through the secret cartels 
and gather proof regarding infringement. Therefore, the Leniency Programme has the primary aim 
of destabilising the cartel by giving incentives to enterprises to approach and collaborate with the 
competition authorities by giving them information about the cartel. Despite this, the MyCC’s 
decisions which published on its website revealed that of the six cartels that were found to have 
committed infringement, none had been first detected through the leniency programme. Thus, it is 
hoped that the recommendations given above will make the leniency programme more attractive 
and can address the existing deficiencies in the programme so that it will attract the cartel 
participants in the future, leading to more cartel detection and better prevention. Through this way, 
it can promote better quality of goods and services, more choices and variety for consumers, more 
innovation as well as economic development and growth. 
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